
# The Hidden Risk of OSS

The Dawn of Software Assembly



# The Language of Security is Risk



# WHAT IS RISK



# "...WE OWE A DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO OUR NEIGHBOR"


Lord Atkin: Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932)

...a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care."



"IT (BUICK) WAS NOT AT LIBERTY TO PUT THE FINISHED PRODUCT ON THE MARKET WITHOUT SUBJECTING THE COMPONENT PARTS TO ORDINARY AND SIMPLE TESTS....THE OBLIGATION TO INSPECT MUST VARY WITH THE NATURE OF THE THING TO BE INSPECTED. THE MORE PROBABLE THE DANGER, THE GREATER THE NEED OF CAUTION."


MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo "...IF THE PROBABILITY BE CALLED P; THE INJURY, L; AND THE BURDEN, B; LIABILITY DEPENDS UPON WHETHER B IS LESS THAN L MULTIPLIED BY P: I.E., WHETHER B < PL".



**United States v. Carroll Towing Co.** 159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947)


Translation: If the Cost of Protecting Against Harm is less than the Cost of the Damage Multiplied by the Likelihood of the Damage, then there is **negligence**.

**Risk = probability x impact** 



# Security concerns are across the Enterprise

Development	Operations	Security
Features	Performance	Security
Usability	Reliability/Scalability	Compliance
Performance	Compliance	Everything Else
Reliability/Scalability	Security	
Maintainability	Maintainability	
Security	Features/Usability	
Compliance		



Prevention	Detection	Monitoring
Firewall	IDS	SIEM
Encryption	SAST	DAM
IPS	DAST	RAST
WebApp Firewall (WAF)	· · - · - · - · ·	

# **Evolution of Spend**





As of December 2

Source: Gartner (December 2011)


 DAST is a very mature market, but is focused primarily late in the development cycle and not integrated into development.

### Pros

- Finds exploitable issues
- Mostly language agnostic
- Finds some infrastructure issues

### Cons

- Often requires complex configuration
- Accuracy drops for nonreflected issues
- Used late in SDLC



re 1. Magic Quadrant for Static Application Security Testing

 SAST is a mature market, but is under represented outside of financial, health/ insurance and retail markets.

### Pros

- Can be leveraged early in the development lifecycle
- Can find issues not found using any DAST

### Cons

- False Positives
- Requires security training to use effectively.
- Scanning varies from hours to days for large applications.

urce: Gartner (December 2010)

- Over the past decade there are have been two predominant security technologies focused at application security.
  - DAST Dynamic Application Security Testing (Blackbox)
  - SAST Static Application Security Testing (Whitebox)


- Over the last couple of years a third as emerged but has not gained significant adoption
  - RAST Runtime Application Security Testing (Glassbox)



# Is the risk in what you see?





# The Ice-Caps are Melting




# Development must change











### Usage of OSS in large enterprises



of whether you use OSS, it's how many components are being used & where

Accenture Open Source Survey 2010



- Discovering a security issue is half the battle
- Transitive and hidden dependencies make it extremely difficult to assign responsibility to propagate fixes throughout the component chain



One component may rely on 00s of others



# Diversity

40,000 Projects 200MM Classes 400K Components



# Volume

Typical Enterprise
Consumes
000s of
Components Monthly



# Change

Typical Component is Updated 4X per Year

Struts 2.3.3	16 April 2012	
Struto 2.3.1.2	22 January 2012	
Struts 2.3.1.1	25 December 2011	\$2-009
Stvs 23.1	12 December 2011	\$2-006, Refy: \$2-009
Struts 223.1	7 September 2011	Marly: 52-008, 52-009
Struts 2.2.3	7 September 2011	\$2-007, Bedy: \$2-008, \$2-009
Stvis 22.1.1	20 December 2010	\$2-006, Bady: \$2-007, \$2-006, \$2-009
Struts 2.2.1	15 August 2010	Nety: 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-008
Struts 2.1.8.1	15 November 2009	\$2-005, Barly: \$2-006, \$2-007, \$2-008, \$2-009
Struts 2.1.8	30 September 2009	Hely: \$2-005, \$2-005, \$2-007, \$2-009
Struta 2.1.6	5 January 2009	Marly: 52-005, 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-009
Struts 2.1.14	24 November 2008	Marly: 52-006, 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-009
Struts 2.8.12	20 October 2008	Marky: 52-005, 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-009
Struto 2.0.11.2	22 June 2008	52-001, 52-004, Marly: 52-005, 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-009
Struto 2.8.11.1	2 Harch 2008	Marty: 52-000, 52-004, 52-005, 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-009
Struts 2 8.11	23 October 2007	\$2.000, Nedy: \$2.000, \$2.000, \$2.000, \$2.000, \$2.000, \$2.000
Struto 2.0.9	24 July 2007	Marky: 52-002, 52-003, 52-004, 52-005, 52-006, 52-007, 52-008, 52-008
Struts 2.1.8	12 June 2007	\$2-001, Bady: \$2-002, \$2-003, \$2-004, \$2-005, \$2-006, \$2-007, \$2-008, \$2-00
Styts 2.1.6	22 February 2007	SHILLING SHILL SHI

# Anatomy of a component based ATTACK

(External Deck)

# No visibility to what components are used, where they are used and where there is risk Visibility

# No way to govern/enforce component usage. Policies are not integrated with development. Control



No efficient way to fix existing flaws.


# 46 Insecure downloads in 2012 Million


organizations downloaded Struts framework with "severe" security flaw

Thousand

organizations downloaded Struts 1.x with known security flaws

Thousand






### The Problem is Not Problem Discovery



- When our software development ecosystem looks like this it is easy to find problems
- The real challenge is to develop at scale and deliver continuous value continuously when everything else is a mess

# GO FAST, BE SECURE



# **Component Lifecycle Management**

1

### **Secure Consumption**

with the use of certified components & integrity checking throughout the lifecycle 2

#### **Govern Development**

to ensure policy compliance without disrupting developer productivity 3

#### **Profile Exposures**

to proactively identify and prioritize action

4

#### Remediate Risk

by preventing & quickly fixing security & IP vulnerabilities


5

#### **Monitor Threats**

in production applications to ensure continuous trust in critical operations




### You Have to Ask the Right Questions



- A How do you choose components to include in your application?
- A Thoughtfully select and identify components using quality, security, and licensing information.
- How do your developers know what components to use, and when they should upgrade?
- A Provide your team with real-time information and updates directly within the tools they use every day.
- Do you monitor and control what makes it into a build?
- A Enforce policy through your build and continuous integration infrastructure.
- Q Do you know your full bill of materials?
- Develop and maintain component inventory for every application.
- Do you know when vulnerabilities are found in deployed components?
- A Monitor component bill of materials for new security flaws and identify applications for critical updates.
- O Do you have global visibility into open source usage?
- A Know how, when, and where components are consumed organization-wide to identify risks before they become a problem.

### Components Can be Compromised



### Automated Policy Management Throughout the Lifecycle



Centralized policy administration simplifies enterprise management

Lifecycle appropriate actions enforce policy automatically

### Building A Better Bridge Between Dev, Ops and Security



- Need to recognize that the priorities are different
- Tooling needs to adopt the practice of the practitioner not the other way around
- A Tool is not a process and a process is not a tool; learn to leverage both.

# Go Fast. Be Secure.

Build security in from the start

**Enforce policy** in the tools you already use

Reduce risk by automating governance throughout the lifecycle

Reduce cost by fixing early in the process

React to new threats by knowing what they are and where to fix them

**Go fast** by using tools your developers already know

# **THANK YOU!**

Bruce Mayhew
Director of Security Research and Development
Sonatype